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PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - v 
COMES NOW Timothy Williams ("Williams" or "Petitioner"), by and through his 
counsel of record, the law firm of Jones • Gledhill • Fuhrman • Gourley, P.A., and hereby 
submits his Brief in reply to the Respondent's Brief filed on or about January 2,2014. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Respondent, the Board of Real Estate Appraisers has at least four insurmountable 
issues with its prosecution of this matter and its February 27, 2009 Final Order that require this 
Court to reverse the Board's Final Order, namely: 
1. The Board committed irreversible procedural error (i.e., there exists no sworn 
complaint and no motions were made to perform the subject investigations); 
2. A substantive error in the law has occurred (i.e., there is no legal basis supporting a 
violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(d) and (e), and there is no factual finding of a 
substantial misrepresentation having occurred pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-4107(1) 
(c), in relation to Counts Two and Eight); 
3. The Petitioner was deprived of a substantial right and due process requires reversal of 
the Board's Final Order; and, 
4. The Board Chairman is biased and punitive in this matter, and his recusal at the 
midnight hour comes too late and is without effect. 
II. PROCEDURAL ERROR 
Idaho Code § 54-4107(1) (2005 version) specifically and unequivocally states that "upon 
a written sworn complaint" or "upon its own motion" the Board may investigate actions of any 
state licensed or certified real estate appraiser. Notwithstanding, the un-refuted testimony of the 
Board's investigator, Cindy Rowland, nlk/a Cindy Stevenson, is that no written sworn complaint 
was even received, and no motion by, or on behalf of, the Board was ever made, to investigate 
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the actions of Petitioner, Timothy Williams. (See, R. Agency Exhs., at Exhibit No. 100 and No. 
800, and R. Agency Tr., at p. 123, I. 16-19.) The Board concedes that it did not comply with the 
clear and unambiguous directive of Idaho Code 54-4107(1). Instead, the Board spends pages and 
pages in its Respondent's Brief trying to justify this procedural problem by asserting it lawfully 
entered into a contract with "IBOL" to perform investigations for the Board. (Resp't Br., p. 3-
10.) This entire discussion by the Board is irrelevant. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) ("The interpretation of a statute must begin with the 
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; 
and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Id. at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (internal citation 
omitted)); See also AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium Dist., 146 Idaho 202, 
192 P.3d 1026 (2008) (the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so 
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. Id. at 204, 192 P.3d at 1028)). 
Likewise, the Board's reliance upon its internal procedures and policies to justify actions 
III excess of clear and unambiguous statutory authority is unavailing. First, Respondent's 
statement that "Pursuant to Exhibit "A," of the Agreement!, IBOL was clearly within its 
authority to initiate the Janoush investigation after receiving a written and sworn complaint" is 
unsupportable. Although the Board is correct that it would have been within its statutory 
authority to initiate the investigation "after receiving a written and sworn complaint" the record 
is undisputed that IBOL did not receive a sworn complaint. Thus, Respondent's reliance upon 
this statement to supports its course of action is without support in the evidentiary record. 
I R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exhibit "A," Agreement for Services Between the Idaho State Real Estate 
Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exhibit "A," mOL Complaint Policy And 
Procedure, pg. 17. 
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The Board then attempts to deal with its procedural irregularities by stating that its 
internal policy was to ignore the clear and unambiguous language in the statute and interpret it to 
only require a "written and signed complaint." This assertion is unsupported both in fact, and in 
law. In particular, apart from citation to the contract between mOL and the Board, the Board's 
repeated reliance upon its internal procedures is unsupported by any evidence presently before 
this Court. For instance, assertions such as "it is clear that the Board interpreted its law to 
allow," and "[t]he Board has never interpreted its law to require 'sworn complaints' " are 
unsupported by any citation to the record before this Court. (Resp't Br., p. 9,10.) Consequently, 
any reliance upon the Board's interpretation of its law and its procedures is erroneous. See Idaho 
Code § 67-5277 (Judicial review is confined to the agency record.) Notwithstanding, and in 
addition, regardless of its standard practice, the Board does not have authority to adopt 
regulations or procedures that are inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous statutory 
authority granted to the Board pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-4107(1). See, Holly Care Center v. 
State, Department of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 78, 714 P.2d 45,47 (1986). The Board cannot 
legislate, and cannot ignore or refuse to comply with clear directives and language in a statute 
enacted by the Idaho legislature. 
Finally, the repeated reliance upon the Board's authority to investigate, absent a sworn 
complaint, pursuant to the more general provision of Idaho Code § 54-4106(2)( c) is likewise 
unavailing. In particular, as noted above, Idaho Code § 54-4107(1) (2005 version) specifically 
and unequivocally states that "upon a written sworn complaint" or "upon its own motion" the 
Board may investigate actions of any state licensed or certified real estate appraiser. Here, the 
unrefuted testimony establishes that no motion by or on behalf of the Board was ever made, to 
investigate the actions of Petitioner, Timothy Williams. (See, R. Agency Exhs., at Exhibit No. 
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100 and No. 800, and R. Agency Tr., at p. 123, t. 16-19.) Consequently, it makes no difference 
whether the investigation was performed by an employee of the Board, an independent 
contractor of the Board, or "IBOL." The issue is not who performed the investigation or whether 
the Board's contract with "IBOL" is proper and enforceable, but rather the issue is whether there 
exists a "written sworn complaint" or a "motion to investigate" by the Board. 
Here, it is undisputed that the Board did not procedurally comply with Idaho Code § 54-
4lO7. Notwithstanding its attempt at justification, the Board acted in excess of its statutory 
authority and cannot cure this procedural defect by citing to unsupportable internal practices. 
I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a) through (e). Moreover, the Board's actions directly violated substantial 
rights of the appellant. Consequently, the Board's Final Order must be vacated as a matter of 
law. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE LAW ERROR 
A. Statutory Law. 
Idaho Code § 54-4107 (2005 version) sets forth when and under what circumstances the 
Board may suspend or revoke any license or certificate issued and states, in part: 
54-4107. Disciplinary proceedings. (1) The board shall upon a 
written sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the 
actions of any state licensed or certified real estate appraiser and may 
suspend or revoke any license or certificate issued under this chapter for 
any of the following: 
(c) Making any substantial misrepresentation, false promises or false 
or fraudulent representations; 
(d) Violating the provisions of this chapter or any rules ofthe Board; 
(e) Being negligent or incompetent, as defined in the uniform 
standards of professional appraisal practices, in developing an appraisal, in 
preparing an appraisal report or in communicating an appraisal; 
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B. Claims of the Board. 
The Board's Amended Complaint sets forth the following claims (reference to Claims 
Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Nine have been omitted because no violation was found): 
1) Count One - Williams allegedly accessed the Wells Fargo RETECHS computerized 
bidding system using a competitor appraisers' name and password, and, thus, violated 
Idaho Code §54-4107(l)(c). 
2) Count Two - Williams allegedly represented he had personally inspected twelve (12) 
properties that were the subject of an appraisal report, but had not actually inspected 
the properties, and, thus, violated Idaho Code §54-4107(1)(c). 
3) Count Eight - Donnelly appraisal - Williams signed an appraisal report regarding 
property located at West Roseberry Road in Donnelly, Idaho that was allegedly 
misleading, and, thus, violated Idaho Code §54-41 07(1)( d) and (e). 
(5;ee, R. Agency, Vol. I, at Tab No. 53.) Thus, pursuant to the Board's Amended Complaint, 
§54-4107(1)( d) and (e) are only applicable to Court Eight relating to the Donnelly appraisal, and 
§54-41 07(1)( c) is only applicable Counts One and Two. 
C. Idaho Code § 54-4107(l)(d). 
As stated above, subsection (l)(d) relates to "violating the provisions of this chapter or 
any rules of Board." Neither the Hearing Officer, Mr. David Wynkoop, nor the Board have cited 
any statutory provision within Idaho Code § 54-4101 et seq. (i.e., the Idaho Real Estate 
Appraisers Act) or a rule of the Board that was allegedly violated by the Petitioner, Timothy 
Williams. Perhaps the Board is asserting a violation of (1)( c) and/or (e) as the basis for a 
violation of (l)(d), but such a position renders the subsection meaningless. Thus, the Board's 
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Final Order decreeing a violation of Idaho Code §54-4107(1)(d) must be reversed because there 
is no factual or legal basis to support this finding. 2 
D. Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e). 
Again, as stated above, Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e) sets forth that the Board may 
suspend or revoke a license when a licensee is negligent or incompetent as defined by US PAP, 
and states: 
(e) Being negligent or incompetent, as defined in the uniform standards of 
professional appraisal practices, in developing an appraisal, in preparing 
an appraisal report or in communicating an appraisal. 
I.C. §54-4107(1)(e) (emphasis added). The unrefuted testimony of Ted Whitmer, and per a 
review of USP AP, establishes that USP AP does not define the terms "negligent" or 
"incompetent." Subsection (e) clearly and unambiguously references that a violation only occurs 
if a licensee is "negligent" or "incompetent," as defined in the uniform standards of professional 
appraisal practices .... " I.C. § 54-4107(1)(e). Because US PAP does not define negligent or 
incompetent, a violation of Idaho Code §54-4107(1)(e) cannot occur. Although the legislature 
may desire to amend the statute because USPAP fails to define these terms, neither the Board nor 
the Court are vested with the authority to legislate such an amendment to the statute. 
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop's Findings of Fact, and the Board's Final 
Order must be reversed as to finding that Petitioner, Timothy Williams violated Idaho Code § 
54-4107(1)( e). 
2 The Board suggests that this issue was raised for the first time on appeal. However, the lack of proof by 
the Board as to any alleged violation of § 54-4107(1)(d) was raised both by Respondent's Motion for 
Reconsideration, (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 89, p. 8); Respondent's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, 
(R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 92, p. 2, , 3); Respondent's Motion for the Board of Real Estate Appraisers 
to Not Approve, Adopt, or Ratify the Recommended Findings and Order of the Hearing Officer, (R. 
Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 93, p. 4, , 11). In addition, the lack of factual findings or evidence to support a 
violation ofIdaho Code §54-4107(1)(d) were raised on appeal to the district court. (R., at p. 000006-15.) 
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Finally, the Board's present reliance upon a violation of USPAP rules to support the 
Board's finding of a violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e) is unsupported by the record. 3 In 
particular, regardless of the present stance taken by the Board, there was no finding by the 
Hearing Officer or by the Board that any alleged violation of USP AP was sufficient to constitute 
a finding of either "negligence" or "incompetence" as required by Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e). 
In short, there was no legal or factual support for the Board's determination that Williams 
violated Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e).4 Consequently, the Board acted in excess of its statutory 
authority in decreeing that Williams violated Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e). 
E. Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(c). 
Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(c) states: 
54-4107. Disciplinary proceedings. (1) The board shall upon a written 
sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the actions of 
any state licensed or certified real estate appraiser and may suspend or 
revoke any license or certificate issued under this chapter for any of the 
following: 
(c) Making any substantial misrepresentation, false promises or false 
or fraudulent representations; 
Neither, the Hearing Office, David Wynkoop's Findings of Fact, nor the Board's Final 
Order, state that the Petitioner Timothy Williams' appraisal certifications on the Tri-Circle and 
Post Falls appraisal reports constituted a "substantial misrepresentation, false promise or false or 
3 Pages 15-17 of Respondent's Brief seek to justify the Board's conclusion that Petitioner violated Idaho 
Code 54-4107 (1 )( e), as well as (c), in relation to the personal investigation of certain properties, Count 
Two. However, the Board never alleged a violation ofIdaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e) with respect to Count 
Two, and neither the Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop nor the Board may decree such a violation 
occurred when it was not pled or alleged. 
4 Instead, the Board appears to advance a theory ofnegligence-per-se based upon a violation USPAP. 
This argument lacks support in the evidentiary record and is unsupported by any legal authority relied 
upon by the Board. 
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fraudulent representation." In essence, there are no findings to support that, pursuant to Count 
Two of the Board's Amended Complaint, a violation ofIdaho Code § 54-4107(l)(c) occurred. 
Similarly, neither the Hearing Officer David Wynkoop's Findings of Fact, nor the 
Board's Final Order, in relation to Count Eight of the Board's Amended Complaint relating to 
the Donnelly appraisal set forth that a "substantial misrepresentation, false promise or false or 
fraudulent representation" occurred. (See, R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 88.) The Board can 
argue that the Donnelly appraisal was allegedly misleading, which is adamantly disputed by 
Timothy Williams, but whether the appraisal is misleading is not the standard. There must be a 
specific finding that the Petitioner, Timothy Williams, made a "substantial misrepresentation, 
false promise or false or fraudulent representation." No such finding was made and the Board's 
Final Order decreeing a violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(c) in relation to the Donnelly 
appraisal should be reversed. 
In addition, the Board never alleged a violation of Idaho Code §54-41 07(1)( c) in relation 
to Count Eight, and neither the Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop nor the Board may decree such 
a violation occurred when it was not pled or alleged. 
IV. PETITIONER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE BOARD. 
A. The Board's arbitrary and capricious application of Idaho Code § 54-4107 and its 
vague and ambiguous terms in order to revoke the license of Petitioner was 
sufficiently raised and preserved for appeal. 
The Board presently argues that Petitioner's argument challenging the constitutionality of 
Idaho Code §54-4107 has been raised for the first time in this appeal. (See, Resp't Br., at p. 10-
16.)5 The Board does not and cannot argue that Petitioner does not have a substantial right to a 
5 The Board's assertion regarding which issues were previously raised narrowly and inaccurately 
construes the record in this case. Petitioner presented evidence and contested the factual and legal 
evidence the Board relied upon to support its claimed violations ofIdaho Code 54-4107; filed a Motion 
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reasonably fair decision making process, and m proper adjudication of the proceeding by 
application of correct legal standards, in the context of these proceedings which involve, 
ultimately, the revocation of Petitioner's license to practice his chosen profession. See State 
Transp. Dept. v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297, 311 P.3d 309 (2013) (determining that, as a 
matter of law, petitioner therein was entitled to challenge the deprivation of a substantial right, 
regardless of whether it was raised in prior proceedings and regardless, that it was sufficiently 
preserved for appeal).6 
The Board likewise suggests that Petitioner was sufficiently on notice of the conduct 
which the Board deemed sufficient to revoke Petitioner's license. In so doing, the Board defines 
the terms "negligent," "incompetent," and "substantial misrepresentation," and declares that "in 
the professional licensing context, a term is not unconstitutionally vague when it is evaluated 
against the declared standards of a profession." (Resp 'f Br., p. 11.) The Board fails to 
for Reconsideration challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of any alleged violations of Idaho law and 
the definitions of the terms utilized against him (R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 89); filed a Motion for 
Involuntary Dismissal as to the claims which the Hearing Officer found a violation (R. Agency, Vol. II, at 
Tab No. 92); filed a Motion for the Board of Real Estate Appraisers to not Approve, Adopt, or Ratify the 
Recommended Findings and Order of the Hearing Officer, again raising both procedural and substantive 
objections to the evidence and the definitions utilized to sanction Petitioner (R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 
93) (see also R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 94). 
6 These substantial rights existing as a matter of course or procedure are 
established, demonstrated, and determined as a matter of law .... 
The lTD contends that the hearing officer should have sustained, not 
vacated the suspension. This appeal involves both aspects of the 
substantial rights noted in Hawkins, namely whether the decision-making 
process was reasonably fair and whether the matter was properly 
adjudicated through the application of correct legal standards. Looking 
at prejudice from the standpoint of material effect, no more prejudicial 
effect can be shown than an erroneous decision on the ultimate outcome 
of a matter in which there can be but two opposing results. 1 0 Once 
again, it is difficult to imagine what the lTD could present to the district 
court in satisfaction of I.e. § 67-5279(4), other than what is apparent as 
a matter of fact and law, which would demonstrate prejudicial effect of 
an erroneous decision to vacate as opposed to sustain the suspension. 
Kalan i-Keegan , 155 Idaho at _,311 P.3d at 315-316 (internal citations omitted). 
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acknowledge that the parties' presented contrary expert testimony on the standard of care and 
upon the actions which would violate those standards. (See e.g., R., Agency Tr., at p. 741, l. 12 
p. 765, I. 24; p. 778, I. 19 p. 910, l. 7.) Moreover, as the Board acknowledges, the ordinary 
meaning of "substantial misrepresentation" "is usually accompanied by an intent to deceive." 
(Resp't Br., p. 13.) The Board also retroactively defines what is meant by "substantial 
misrepresentation" for the purposes of Idaho Code § 54-41 07( 1)( c), but fails to identify how this 
definition should be evaluated against the declared standards of the appraisal profession.7 The 
Board did not present evidence, and the Hearing Officer did not make any finding, that 
Petitioner's action in entering the Wells Fargo RETECH system was accompanied by an "intent 
to deceive," nor was there any evidence or finding that Petitioner's actions fell below the 
declared standards of the appraisal profession. 
Additionally, the Board's argument that the terms "negligent" and "incompetent" as used 
in Idaho Code § 54-4107 are not unconstitutionally vague is unsupported by the plain language 
of Idaho Code §54-4107, which specifically requires that those terms be applied "as defined in 
the uniform standards of professional appraisal practices .... " I.C. § 54-4107(1)( e ) (emphasis 
added). As noted above, those terms are not defined in the uniform standards. It is unclear 
whether the Board alleged or sanctioned Petitioner for conduct which it determined to be 
"negligent" or "incompetent" as the Board appeared to utilize those terms interchangeably. At 
the hearing and continuing through their briefing upon appeal, the Board appears to take the 
position that failure to adhere to a standard of USP AP is per se negligence and/or incompetence. 
There is no evidence or law cited to support this theory and the Board acted in excess of its 
7 In point of fact, the Hearing Officer specifically found that Mr. Williams' conduct with respect to the 
Wells Fargo RETECH access claim, Count One, did not constitute a violation of US PAP. (R. Agency, 
Vol. II, at Tab No. 88, p. 9.) Thus, it is unclear what professional standards the Board claims Petitioner's 
conduct should have been measured against in this case. 
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statutory and constitutional authority in arbitrarily defining and applying these terms ex post 
facto to justify its course of conduct. 
Similarly, the Board's argument that the Hearing Officer heard testimony regarding 
Petitioner's conduct in comparison to the standards of US PAP misses the point - that Idaho 
Code § 54-4107(1)(e) expressly requires a showing of "negligence" or "incompetence." (Resp't 
Br., p. 14.) Even assuming that Petitioner's conduct were to be evaluated in the context of 
professional standards, there is no showing and no evidence that a failure to adhere to any 
particular USP AP standard of conduct is "negligence" or "incompetence" for the purposes of 
Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)( e). Thus, the present claim that Petitioner was sufficiently on notice of 
the conduct which the Board would later deem to constitute "negligence" and/or 
"incompetence," is unsupported by the record and by the law. Moreover, the Hearing Officer did 
not make a finding that Petitioner's conduct with respect to any particular USP AP standard 
constituted "negligence" or "incompetence." 
As recognized in H&V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Board of Professional Engineers 
and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 747 P.2d 55 (1987), "[t]he court is obliged, however, to 
reverse a decision if substantial rights of an individual have been prejudiced because the 
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are 'in violation of constitutional or 
statutory provisions.' " Id. at 649, 747 P.2d at 58, (citing I.C. § 67-5215(g); Allen v. Lewis-Clark 
State College, 105 Idaho 447, 452, 670 P.2d 854,859 (1983)). The case ofH&V Engineering is 
particularly applicable where, as here, the "grounds for discipline have not been defined by 
statute nor by the Board itse1f..." Id., at 650, 747 P.2d at 59. As with H&V Engineering, 
nowhere does Idaho Code § 54-4107 nor USP AP define the grounds for discipline; for example, 
no regulation defines failure to strictly adhere to a particular USPAP standard as "negligence" or 
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"incompetence." See Jd., at 650, 747 P.2d at 59.8 The Board's decision to revoke Petitioner's 
license, absent articulating clear standards of discipline, exceeded the constitutional and statutory 
authority granted to the Board and must be reversed.9 
V. BIASED AND PUNITIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 
The Chairman of the Board, Mr. Brad lanoush has a personal vendetta against Timothy 
Williams. The bias of Mr. lanoush and its pervasive effect upon the Board was raised multiple 
times before the Board and in these proceedings. The claim that Petitioner did not sufficiently 
preserve the issue of lack of due process and its effect upon the outcome of this case is 
unsupported. The Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop specifically found on p. 8 of the Findings of 
Fact: 
Clearly, Mr. lanoush was biased, Mr. lanoush went to great lengths to 
inform others of the inappropriate RETECHS access by Mr. Williams. 
Mr. lanoush believed that Mr. Williams' Idaho appraisal license should be 
revoked. He even went so far as to advise Mr. Williams to leave town and 
if he failed to do so, Mr. lanoush would see that Mr. Williams' license 
was revoked. In addition, the March 21, 2011, Board minutes reflect that 
three and a half years into this litigation, Chairman of the Board Brad 
lanoush refused to recuse himself despite the recommendation of Board 
counsel to do so. 
(See, R., at p. 0000382, Second Affidavit of Kimbell Gourley, Exhibit B, and R. 
Agency Tr., at p. 205. 1. 14-25; p. 206, I. 1-25; and p. 207, l. 1-14.) 
8 The Officer gave passing recognition to Petitioner's argument and evidence that, absent damages, there 
could be no proof of negligence. (See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 88, p. 11.) The prejUdice inherent in 
the lack of a defined standard is particularly evident where, as here, Petitioner was not sufficiently warned 
as to the standards by which his conduct would be measured and how, in turn, any particular conduct 
would subject him to discipline. 
9 Reversal, rather than a remand is appropriate where, as here, the standards upon which the Board 
disciplined Petitioner did not warn Petitioner of the prohibited conduct. See H&V Engineering, 113 Idaho 
at 652, 747 P.2d at 61. 
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Mr. lanoush also elected to attend the trial of this matter on the day subsequent to 
completing his witness testimony. Brad Janoush was biased and punitive in relation to Timothy 
Williams and poisoned the remaining Board members to the point that the remaining Board 
members could no longer be unbiased and render a fair and impartial decision. The Board 
responds to this argument by asserting that Brad Janoush recused himself at the midnight hour at 
the February 10, 2012 Board meeting. This last minute recusal was meaningless in the big 
picture of this proceeding because Brad Janoush had already created the prejudice and bias, and 
set the stage for the Board's Final Order, by participating in the discussions, debates and 
proceedings since his appointment to the Board in December, 2008. In light of Mr. Janoush's 
conduct and adamant bias, there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that the Board 
members were not in a position to render a fair and impartial decision after being subjected to the 
Chairman's adamant views that Timothy Williams violated Idaho law and should have his 
license revoked as stated by Mr. Janoush back in 2004 and going forward. Accordingly, the 
Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and the Board's Final Order should be reversed. 
VI. FINAL ORDER 
The Board's Order was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of the Board's discretion. 
This issue is further evidenced by the manner in which the Board handled the award of attorney 
fees to itself in this matter, claiming victory upon far more claims that it actually succeeded 
upon. (See R., Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 97.) Absent articulating clear standards by which the 
Board intended to sanction Petitioner, the Board proceeded to hearing and thereafter revoked 
Petitioner's license after having only prevailed upon a small fraction of the claims it alleged. For 
the reasons previously stated and supported in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's Final Order 
should be reversed. 
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CROSS APPEAL 
VII. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Board has cross-appealed the decision of the district court, reversing the Board's 
award of attorney fees to itself. For the reasons stated below, the district court properly analyzed 
the issue and correctly applied the law. 
A. Background and Procedural History 
Pursuant to the Board's Final Order, entered February 27, 2012, the Board ordered 
Petitioner to pay the Board's costs and attorneys' fees: 
Respondent shall pay to the Board the costs and attorney's fees incurred 
by the Board in the investigation and prosecution of Respondent regard 
the four violations of the Board's laws and rules as set forth above. The 
State shall submit an Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees incurred 
in this matter within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. 
Respondent shall submit any objection to the costs and fees submitted by 
the State, and request a hearing within fifteen (15) days from the receipt 
of the State's Affidavit. Thereafter, the Board shall detennine the 
amount of costs and fees awarded against Respondent, and in the event 
Respondent fails to object to the costs and fees claimed by the State, 
Respondent shall by the costs and fees as set forth in its affidavit. 
Respondent shall pay the costs and fees as detennined by the Board, or as 
set forth in this section, within one hundred eighty (180) days from the 
date of this Order. 
(See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 96, p. 3 (emphasis added).) It is undisputed that the Board 
failed to submit an Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees within thirty (30) days from the date 
of the Final Order. Instead, on April 3, 2012, the Board filed its (untimely) Affidavit of Costs 
and Fees ("Board's Affidavit"), claiming total costs and fees of $34,131.17. (See R. Agency, Vol. 
IL at Tab No. 97, p. 2.) The Board did not file a motion to extend the time to file the Affidavit 
prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day deadline established by the Board's own Order. 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL -14 
On April 4, 2012, Williams timely filed his Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and 
Costs ("Respondent's Objection"), and requested a hearing. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., 
at Attachment A.) On April 10, 2012, William filed a Supplement to Objection to Award of 
Attorney Fees and Costs, in which Williams objected to the Board's Affidavit and moved that no 
attorney's fees be awarded because the Board's Affidavit was untimely. (See R. Agency Cert., 
Second Supp., at Attachment B.) 
On April 10, 2012, the Board requested, and was granted, a schedule to permit the parties 
to brief the issues of the award of attorneys' fees, pursuant to which the Board filed its Response 
to Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs on May 21,2012. (See R. Agency Cert., 
Second Supp., at Attachment C.) In addition, the Board filed affidavits from Lori Peel and 
Dennis Stevenson. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachments D and E.) 
On June 4, 2012, Petitioner filed his Reply in Support of Objection to Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, in which Petitioner noted the lack of a motion to extend time to file 
the Board's Affidavit. Only after Petitioner raised this issue did the Board file its Motion to 
Extend Time to File the Affidavit of Costs and Fees, which Motion was filed on June 6, 2012. 
Petitioner filed his Objection to the Board's Motion to Extend Time to File the Affidavit of Costs 
and Fees on June 8, 2012. (See R. Agency eert., Second Supp., at Attachment G.) 
On June 18, 2012, the Board, at its regular meeting, took up the matter of the Board's 
Affidavit of Costs and Fees and Respondent's Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
(See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H.) On August 2,2012, the Board entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees. Id. 
On August 17, 2012, Williams filed his First Amended Notice of Appeal to include the 
Board's Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees, entered on August 2, 2012. On 
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July 1, 2013, the district court entered its order reversing the Board's decision to award itself 
attorney fees upon the grounds that the Board's decision exceeded its statutory authority. For the 
same reasons, this Court should uphold the district court's ruling and reverse the Board's award 
of attorney fees. 
B. Applicable Procedural Statutes 
Idaho Code §67-2609 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) The bureau of occupational licenses shall wherever the several laws 
regulating professions, trades and occupations which are devolved upon 
the bureau for administration so require pursuant to written agreement as 
provided in section 67-2604, Idaho Code, exercise, in its name, or as 
authorized agent, but subject to the provisions of this chapter, the 
following powers: 
(6) To formulate rules for adoption by the boards allowing the boards to 
recover costs and fees incurred in the investigation and prosecution 
of a licensee in accordance with the contested case provisions of 
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for a violation of laws or rules of 
the boards. 
(7) To formulate rules for adoption by the boards establishing a schedule 
of civil fines which may be imposed upon a licensee prosecuted in 
accordance with the contested case provisions of chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code, for a violation of laws or rules of the boards. Any civil 
fine collected by a board for a violation of its laws or rules shall not 
exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), unless otherwise provided by 
statute, and shall be deposited in the bureau of occupational licensing 
account. 
IDAPA 24.18.01.525 ("Board Rule 525") authorizes the Board to(l) impose a civil fine 
not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation ofIdaho Code § 54-4107; and (2) 
order a licensed or certified real estate appraiser to pay the costs and fees incurred by the Board 
in the investigation and prosecution of a licensee. IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02 (emphasis added). 
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a) provides: 
02. Time for Filing for Costs and/or Fees Awarded in Final Order or Preliminary 
Order. Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule of the agency: (4-7-11) 
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a. Minimum time for filing. When a final order or a preliminary order of the 
agency awards costs and/or fees to a party or to the agency itself, the agency must 
allow no fewer than fourteen (14) days from the service date of the final order or 
the preliminary order for the party to whom costs and/or fees were awarded or for 
the agency to file necessary papers (e.g., a memorandum of costs, affidavits, 
exhibits, etc.) quantifying and otherwise supporting costs or fees, or both, that will 
be claimed or a motion to extend the time to file for costs and fees. (4-7-11) 
IDAPA 04.11.01. 741.02(a) (emphasis added). 
C. The Board's decision to award attorney's fees lacks support in the law and was 
unfounded, arbitrarv, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
This Court may reverse an agency decision made in excess of the statutory authority of 
the agency. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The Board's decision to award itself attorney fees is just such a 
decision. "In order for attorney fees to be awarded pursuant to a statute, the statute must clearly 
contemplate that particular remedy." Sanchez v. State Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 243, 
141 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2006) (citing Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 102 Idaho 
744, 751, 639 P.2d 442,449 (1981) ("[I]t is clear that the Idaho legislature has provided for the 
award of attorney fees specifically when it so intends, and only when it so intends.")). 
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the authority of the Board to investigate and prosecute 
violations of the Act and to recover costs and fees incurred in the investigation and prosecution 
of a licensee. See I.e. § 67-2609; IDAPA 24.18.01.525. However, the Board's reliance upon 
this same authority to support an award of attorneys' fees is misplaced. The language ofldaho 
Code § 67-2609, and IDAPA 24.18.01.525, is clear and unambiguous: it expressly authorizes a 
fine, costs, and fees, only. IDAPA 24.18.01.525 ("The Board may order a licensed or certified 
real estate appraiser to pay the costs and fees incurred by the Board in the investigation or 
prosecution of the licensee for violation of Section 54-4107(1), Idaho Code.") There is no 
provision for an award of attorneys' fees. Cf Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243, 141 P.3d at 1112 ("the 
statute must clearly contemplate that particular remedy.") Consequently, although the Board 
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relies upon its authority to formulate rules "for adoption by the board" to recover costs and fees, 
the fact of the matter is that the Board, even if it had the authority, did not formulate a rule for 
the recovery of attorneys' fees. 
To further illustrate the fallacy of the Board's position on this matter, there is a 
distinction between the Board awarding itself fees, such as witness fees, which are specifically 
contemplated by Idaho Code § 54-4107(2), and the Board awarding itself attorneys' fees. Cf 
Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243, 141 P.3d at 1112. This distinction is particularly evident upon a 
review of statutes authorizing the award of attorneys' fees in similar circumstances. For 
instance, Idaho Code § 54-1806A authorizes the State Board of Medicine to assess "costs and 
attorney's fees against the respondent physician for any investigation and/or administrative 
proceeding."(emphasis added); Idaho Code § 54-2059 authorizes the Idaho real estate 
commission to "temporarily suspend or permanently revoke licenses issued under the provisions 
of this chapter, issue a formal reprimand and impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed 
five thousand dollars ($5,000), and assess costs and attorneys' fees for the cost of any 
investigation and administrative or other proceedings against any licensee who is found to have 
violated any section of the Idaho Code, the commission's administrative rules or any order of the 
commission." (emphasis added). That Board now seeks to interpret its own rules to include 
attorneys' fees, despite the lack of a specific provision to this effect, is beyond the statutory 
authority granted to the Board. 
Similarly, the Board's reliance upon Ada County Highway Dist. By & Through 
Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), to support an award of attorneys' 
fees in the present matter, is inapposite. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment C, 
pp. 2-3.) Acarrequi was a condemnation case, not an administrative proceeding, and it was tried 
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to the district court. Therein, the district court awarded the prevailing party its attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code 12-121. 10 Idaho Code § 12-121 
does not, however, provide authority for an award of fees in an administrative action such as the 
present matter. See Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243, 141 P.3d at 1112. As noted by the Court in 
Sanchez: 
Idaho Code section 12-121 authorizes a court to award the prevai ling party fees 
"in any civil action" where the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously. 
Minich v. Gem State Dev., Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). 
This Court has clarified that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a) "clearly declares 
that 'a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.' " Lowery 
v. Board of County Com 'rs for Ada County, 117 Idaho 1079, 1081, 793 P.2d 1251, 
1253 (1990). 
!d. Based upon the foregoing, the Board's reliance upon Acarrequi, a civil action, to establish 
precedent for the theory that the Board has the authority to award attorneys' fees, 
notwithstanding the absence of an authorizing statute or rule, is meritless. 
The Board exceeded its authority in ordering Williams to pay attorneys' fees incurred by 
the Board. The language of Idaho Code §67-2609, and IDAPA 24.18.01.525 is clear and 
unambiguous: it expressly authorizes a fine, costs, and fees, only. There is no provision for an 
award of attorneys' fees. Consequently, Williams requests that the Court uphold the district 
court's reversal of the Board's decision to award itself any attorneys' fees. 
10 In Acarrequi, the Court specifically noted "[w]e deem it necessary to adopt a new standard governing an 
award of both attorneys' fees and costs, only as it relates to a condemnation proceeding." (emphasis added). 
105 Idaho at 875, 673 P.2d at 1069. In Acarrequi, the Court also said that in deciding whether to award 
attorney fees, the trial court "should" consider the following factors: 
(I) "a condemnor should have reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at least 90 per cent 
of the ultimate jury verdict;" 
(2) "an offer would not be timely if made on the courthouse steps an hour prior to trial;" and 
(3) "[a]n offer should be made within a reasonable period after the institution of the action to 
relieve the condemnee not only of the expense but of the time, inconvenience and apprehension 
involved in such litigation, and also to eliminate the cloud which may hang over the condemnees 
title to the property." 
State ex ref. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 320, 940 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1997) (quoting Acarrequi, I 05 Idaho at 878, 
673 P.2d at 1072). 
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D. The Board's finding that the costs and fees ordered bv the Board are not excessive 
or unreasonable was unfounded, arbitrarY, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
By its' Memorandum Decision and Order, the Board awarded itself the entirety of its 
requested attorneys' fees. As noted above, this decision exceeded the statutory authority of the 
Board and should therefore be reversed. Moreover, in awarding itself the entirety of the 
requested amount of attorneys' fees and costs, the Board's decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence or the record as a whole. In addition, and recognizing the enormity of the 
hurdle to prevail on a claim that the Board abused its discretion, Petitioner submits that this case 
presents just that factual scenario: In particular, that the Board, in awarding itself its own claimed 
attorneys' fees and costs, grossly mischaracterized the number of claims that it actually prevailed 
upon to apportion the claimed attorneys' fees and costs and further neglected to address the 
unreasonableness of the amount of time expended by the Board when contrasted with that of 
Petitioner's counsel. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H, p. 10.) Moreover, if, 
as is evident in the record, the Board expended an excessive amount of time on this matter, the 
Board should not be permitted to use the apportionment which it, by law, is required to do, as a 
means to suggest that the Board has satisfied its obligation to review the reasonableness of the 
Boards' request for attorneys' fees, fees, and costs as a whole. 
In support of its decision to award itself the entirety of its own claimed attorneys' fees, 
the Board relies primarily upon the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Haw v. idaho State Board 
of Medicine, 143 Idaho 51, 137 P.3d 438 (2006). However, Haw dictates that the Board's 
decision to award itself the entirety of its claimed attorneys' fees is not supported by the record 
and is an abuse of discretion. First, the attorney fee award in Haw was made pursuant to Idaho 
Code §54-1806A(9), which specifically provides the board of medicine with the authority to 
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"assess[] costs and attorney's fees." II As noted above, there is no such authorizing statute 
authorizing the Board's award of attorneys' fees in the instant matter. 
Second, the Board's reliance upon Haw to support its decision is flawed. The Court in 
Heat' cautioned that while the board prevailed on a fairly small part of the allegations made, the 
board did not prevail on the majority of its claims, and therefore, that an award of the entirety of 
the fees incurred was not appropriate. Haw, 143 Idaho at 54-55,137 P.3d at 441-442. 
The guiding principle is that the sanction must be related to the 
discipline; I.C. § 54-1806A(9) does not authorize an open-ended sanction 
simply because some form of discipline has been imposed. The Board 
must engage in a meaningful analysis of the charges made in relation to 
the charges upon which the Board was successful. While the Board need 
not add up the allegations and calculate with mathematical precision who 
won the most claims, there should be some analysis of precisely how 
much time and effort went into proving the misconduct that resulted in 
discipline. Here, the Board used what the hearing officer described as a 
"shotgun approach" in making its allegations against Haw, who therefore 
felt it necessary to present a full defense to every allegation. While the 
Board is entitled to list as many violations as it thinks appropriate and 
supported by its investigation, it must be mindful the doctor will, as a 
result, be forced to defend against everyone of the claims charged. 
Id. at 54-55, 137 P.3d at 441-442. Consequently, the Haw Court directed the board to "consider 
how many of the claims the doctor prevailed on, the overall success in supporting the Board's 
allegations and the amount of time and effort devoted to proving the claimed misconduct for 
which discipline was imposed, as opposed to the total time spent in pursuing all of the 
allegations." !d. at 55, 137 P.3d at 442 (emphasis added.) 
Though the Board sought and received a restriction on Haw's use of 
injectable hormones, it also sought discipline based on allegations of 
Haw's poor handwriting, his use of lab testing, his stereotypical and 
incomplete charting and record keeping, and his dealings with 
consultants. In light of the multiple allegations made, the Board cannot 
11 As noted by the Court in Haw, the Court must first determine whether an award of attorney fees is authorized by 
the enabling statute. Based upon the language of I.e. § 54-1806A(9), the Court concluded that "this statute clearly 
gives the Board authority to assess attorney fees as a sanction if grounds for discipline are found to exist after the 
merits of all proceedings have been considered." 143 Idaho at 53, 137 P.3d at 440. 
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claim it was fully successful in what it was seeking to achieve and, 
therefore, is entitled to all its fees and costs. In actuality, the Board was 
successful on a fairly small part of the allegations made and the Board 
should have taken that into account in assessing any sanction relating to 
fees and costs. 
Here, based upon the formula utilized by the Board, it is undisputed that the Board 
awarded to itself attorneys' fees, fees such as witness fees, and costs incurred to prosecute 
conduct the hearing officer found to be unsanctionable. Cj' Haw, 143 Idaho at 55, 137 P.3d at 
442. Apart from asserting that that Board "engaged in a detailed and meaningful 
apportionment," the record actually suggests that the Board gave no recognition to the fact that it 
prevailed on only a small fraction of the claims alleged. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at 
Attachment H, p. 9.) In particular, the Board gives itself credit for prevailing on Counts 1, 2, and 
8, or 113 of the "counts" alleged. See Id. However, this calculation is a gross misrepresentation 
of the actual claims that the Board actually pursued against Williams. In the present matter, the 
Board, much like the Board in Haw, engaged in a shotgun approach in making its allegations 
against Williams, and subsequently failed to account for the fact that it did not prevail upon a 
significant majority of these claims. Rather, the Board suggests that because the violations that 
were found were "serious," that the claimed fees were reasonable. This logic and analysis lacks 
support in the evidentiary record and in the law. 
Pursuant to the Board's original complaint and amended complaint, the Board asserted 41 
separate claims of violations against Williams which were encompassed within nine counts (i.e. 
Count One - 1 claim; Count Two, 12 claims; Count Three - 4 claims; Count Four - 18 claims; 
Count Five - 1 claim; Count Six 1 claim; Count Seven 2 claims; Count Eight 1 claim; 
Count Nine - 1 claim). (See R. Agency, Vol. I, at Tab No.1.) Williams prevailed on 37 of the 
claims and the Board prevailed on 4 of the claims. (See R. Agency, Vol. I, at Tab No. 88; R. 
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Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 96.) Thus, Williams prevailed on 90.24% of the claims alleged by the 
Board. Yet, the Affidavit of Katherine Takasugi goes through a complicated allocation process, 
but ultimately requests 44.63423% of the total fees charged to the Board be paid by the 
Williams. (See R. Agenq, Vol. II., at Tab No. 97.) In addition, the Board relies upon the 
existence of Count 9, a claim that was dismissed, to conclude that it prevailed on 1/3 of the 
claims asserted. (See R. Agency, Vol. II. , at Tab No. 97, Exhibit A - Affidavit of Katherine 
Takasugi, pg. 2, ~ 4) ("For any work that applied generally to all counts the fees have been 
allocated "1/3", since the State prevailed in three out of nine counts."). 
In addition, as regards Count Eight of the Board's Amended Complaint, Williams 
prevailed on three out of four of these allegations, and the Board's Final Order only references 
an alleged failure to properly disclose the availability of sewer to the property. (See R. Agency, 
Vol. II. , at Tab No. 96.) Ms. Takasugi's affidavit charges 100% of all time spent on exclusively 
Count Eight and the other formulas used by Ms. Takasugi assume that the Board was fully 
successful in Count Eight. (See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 97.) To the contrary, the Board 
was only successful on one out of four of its allegations. Thus, inclusion of 100% of fees 
charged relating exclusively to Count Eight, or incorporation of fees relating to Count Eight and 
other counts and claims for which the Board was unsuccessful, is an abuse of discretion. 
Thus, even though the Board only prevailed on less than 10% of its claims, it is asking 
for 412 times that equivalent amount for attorneys' fees, based purely upon a subjective 
determination as to what claim each time entry related. Using a formula approach, as advocated 
by the Affidavit of Katherine Takasugi, the calculation of attorneys' fees to be awarded to the 
Board would be 9.7561 % times $48,528.99, for a total of $4,734.54. The Board's decision to 
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award itself the entirety of the fees and costs requested (by the Board) was arbitrary, capricious, 
and an abuse of discretion. 
E. The Board's counsels' hours are excessive and unreasonable. 
The Board further abused its discretion in determining that the amount of claimed 
attorneys' fees was reasonable because the amount of attorney time charged by the Board was 
excessive. In particular, the Board's counsel charged 860.44 total hours in relation to this 
matter. (See R. Agency, Vol. lI., at Tab No. 97.) The Respondent Tim Williams counsel charged 
271.90 hours to this matter. (See R. Agency, Vol. lI., at Tab No. 99.) Thus, the Respondent Tim 
Williams' counsel only billed 31.60% of the hours billed by the Board's counsel. The Board 
concluded that because of the proration the Board performed, that any analysis of the 
reasonableness of the cost and fee request was unreasonable. This conclusion lacks support in the 
law and in the facts. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H) In particular, the 
Board's decision to ignore the excessive amount of time charged to Petitioner, prior to any 
proration applied thereto, fails to take into account the reasonableness of the request. 
In large part, it appears that the excessive amount of time expended by the Board's 
counsel was caused by the Board's own conduct. The Board's initial counsel in this matter were 
Michael Gilmore and Melissa Moody. (See R. Agency, Vol. lI., at Tab No. 97.) Then in 2011, 
Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Moody were no longer affiliated with the matter and Katherine Takasugi 
and Rob Adelson were assigned to the matter. Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Moody spent years on this 
matter and had an extensive knowledge about the claims, defenses, and issues. This knowledge 
base was lost when Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Moody were removed from the matter, and many, 
many hours were necessarily incurred by Ms. Takasugi and Mr. Adelson to acquire this 
equivalent knowledge base. Petitioner had nothing to do with this reassignment of counsel and 
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should not be penalized or detrimentally affected in any way by this Board decision. In 
awarding itself attorneys' fees, the Board deemed the total requested fees, including duplicate 
time to be "reasonable and appropriate." (See R. Agency Cert .. Second Supp., at Attachment H, p. 
11.) This finding is unsupported by the record as a whole: that the Board expended more than 
three times the amount of time of Petitioner's counsel; that the Board awarded itself attorney fees 
for work that was duplicative of work previously performed by the Board's counsel; and, that the 
Board failed to account for any reduction in the amount of attorneys' fees charged to Petitioner 
for claims which the Board did not actually prevail upon. The Board abused its discretion in 
failing to take into account the foregoing in its award of attorney fees to itself. 
F. The Board's consideration of the Board's (admittedly untimely) Affidavit of Costs 
and Fees was unfounded, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
The Board abused its discretion in granting the Board's Motion to Extend Time to File 
Affidavit of Costs and Attorney Fees. In particular, the Board, in its Final Order entered on 
February 27, 2012, stated on page 3, that any request for attorneys' fees and costs by the Board 
shall be made within thirty (30) days of the date of the Board's Final Order. (See R. Agency, Vol. 
II, at Tab No. 96.) Thus, this time period expired on March 28, 2012. On April 3, 2012, Marci 
Rightnowar filed an Affidavit of Costs and Fees. (See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 97.) This 
affidavit was undisputedly untimely. Accordingly, and pursuant to its own deadline, the Board 
waived its right to claim attorney fees and costs. The Board's decision to excuse this failure, 
absent a showing of "good cause," was an abuse of discretion. 
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a) requires that the Board either timely file its "necessary 
papers", which the Board failed to do, or file a motion to extend the time to file for costs and 
fees. On April 4, 2012, Petitioner filed his Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. (See 
R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment A.) On April 10, 2012, Petitioner filed his 
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Supplement to Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, wherein Petitioner requested that 
the claimed fees and costs be disallowed because the Affidavit of Fees and Costs was untimely 
pursuant to the Board's own Final Order. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment B.) 
Prior or contemporaneous to filing its Affidavit of Fees and Costs, the Board failed to file a 
motion to extend time to file the Affidavit. Rather, on May 21, 2012, the Board filed its 
Response to Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs wherein the Board asserted that 
the request for fees and costs could still be considered [by the Board] pursuant to IDAPA 
04.11.01.741.02(d) which provides that "[t]he agency may exercise its discretion to consider and 
grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown." As of May 21,2012, the 
Board had still not filed a motion to enlarge time, despite its reliance upon IDAPA 
04.1 1.01. 741.02(a) and (d). It was not until after Petitioner raised the lack of a pending motion 
to enlarge that the Board conveniently elected to file its motion to enlarge, which it subsequently 
granted pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees. (See R. Agency 
Cert., Second Supp., at Attachments G and H.) In so doing, the Board's determination that 
"based upon a review of the totality of the circumstances, there is good cause for the untimely 
filing of the State's Affidavit of Costs and Fees," is (1) not supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole; and (2) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. (See Id. at 
Attachment H, pg. 12.) 
By its Response to Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs, the Board 
acknowledges that the Order is clear and unambiguous, that it reviewed the Order, and that 
Katherine Takasugi provided her affidavit to the Bureau 5-days prior to the deadline set forth in 
the Board's own Order. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachrnent C, pp. 8-14.) Instead, 
the Board asserted, and subsequently adopted pursuant to its decision, the claim that Ms. Peel, a 
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paralegal working with the team of attorneys working for the Board, failed to note the 30-day 
time limit: "[b]ecause of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in HaH' v. Board o/Medicine, 143 
Idaho 51 (2006), I focused on ensuring that the costs were apportioned and did not notice that the 
Final Order gave the 30-day time period within which to file the affidavit of costs and attorney 
fees rather than the 45-day time period provided in current final orders. " (See R. Agency Cert., 
Second Supp., at Attachment D, Affidavit ol Lori Peel is Support 0/ State's Response to 
Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs, ~ 7.) However, no "current final orders" 
were provided to support this assertion. In addition, upon review of the invoices attached to the 
Affidavit of Costs and Fees, each of the "costs" claimed were known to the Bureau months, if 
not years, before the deadline set by the Board. (See R. Agency, Vol. II. , at Tab No. 97, 
Exhibits.) 12 There exists no "good cause" for the assertion that the Bureau could not have 
timely filed the Affidavit of Fees and Costs pursuant to the Board's Order. Moreover, there can 
be no argument that, out of the team of attorneys assigned to work on this case who spent more 
than 860 hours to prosecute this case, that Ms. Peel's calendaring mistake, which appears to be 
personal to Ms. Peel since Ms. Takasugi timely provided her Affidavit to the Board, excuses the 
Board's failure to comply with its own scheduling deadline. In this regard, it is particularly 
noteworthy that the 30-day deadline set by the Board, and then missed by the Board, was far in 
excess of the default 14-day deadline set forth in IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a). 
Moreover, there is no assertion that the 30-day deadline, set by the Board itself, was 
anything other than conspicuous. In fact, that Ms. Takasugi complied with the deadline and 
12 In particular, Exhibit B, Invoices from Uranga and Uranga were marked received by the Bureau no later than 
October 26,2010; Exhibit C containing invoices from Sherer and Wynkoop, LLP were marked received by the 
Bureau no later than January 4,2012; Exhibit D, Invoices for Denise Graham for court reporting services and 
transcripts were received by the Bureau in or around December, 8, 2011; Exhibits E and F relate to Invoices from 
Integrity Appraisal, the majority of which were marked received by the Bureau in 2007 and the most recent marked 
received by August 29, 20 II; Exhibit G is an Affidavit of Witness Expenses signed September 9, 20 II; Exhibit H 
appears to be an undated invoice for Investigator services provided by Cindy Stephenson between 2006 and 2007. 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - 27 
submitted her Affidavit is evidence of the fact that at least one of the attorneys for the Board 
reco.brnized the deadline. (See R. Agency Cert .. Second c)'Upp .. at Attachment C) Upon receipt of 
Ms. Takasugi's Affidavit, it would seem reasonable that at least one other attorney for the 
Bureau or Ms. Peel would have taken immediate action to ensure that the same was timely filed 
with the Board. That the Bureau then failed to take any action with respect to the motion, 
notwithstanding the notice provided in the Order and the receipt of the Takasugi affidavit, until 
April 3, does not merit a finding of "good cause" or "excusable neglect" as contemplated by 
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(d). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA, 149 Idaho 532, 237 P.3d 1, (2010), expressly 
rejected a similar argument: 
The Bedkes urge that the confusion they suffered due to the combined 
recommendation and order, coupled with the February 28 calendar entry, 
excuses their untimely filing of their notice of challenge and that pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 55(c) the court should have heard their challenge. . .. 
Consistent with the express terms of I.R.C.P. 6(b), this Court reviews a 
trial court's decision whether to grant a motion for enlargement for abuse 
of discretion. Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286, 289, 596 P.2d 798,801 
(1979). 
We are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying the Bedkes' motion to deem their challenge as timely filed. The 
district court noted that the special master's order denying the Bedkes' 
motion to alter or amend and recommending attorney fees "clearly and 
unequivocally separates the order on the motion to alter or amend from 
the special master's recommendation on costs and fees." The district court 
continued, stating: 
... Had Bedkes checked the docket sheet or the register of actions for the 
case they would have seen entries for both the order denying the motion 
to alter or amend and the special master's recommendation with objection 
deadline. 
More importantly, the district court noted that the Bedkes need not have 
consulted the register of actions or the court's docket sheet, since they 
were parties to the subcase and had actual notice of the special master's 
actions, which were clearly delineated. The district court concluded that 
"the Bedkes are not new to the SRBA process and have previously filed a 
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challenge to the Presiding Judge. The Court does not find the Bedkes' 
alleged confusion to be reasonable under the circumstances. 
Jd. at 538-539, 237 P.3d at 7-8. 
The Board, in its decision to grant its own untimely Motion to Enlarge Time, in order to 
consider its untimely Affidavit of Costs and Fees, failed to take into account any of the factual 
and legal arguments raised by Petitioner. Instead, the Board determined that "it is simply not 
reasonable for a mistake made in good faith to deprive this Board of its authority to impose 
discipline it feels reasonable and just in the circumstances, not only on the basis of carrying out 
its disciplinary authority, but also for the benefit of the licensees who support the Board's 
operations." (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H, pg. 12.) That the Board now 
seeks to justify its conduct "for the benefit of the [ other] licensees" is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether "good cause" exists for the act of the belated filing of the Affidavit of 
Costs and Fees, and is a patent abuse of discretion. 
Finally, the assertion that Petitioner is not prejudiced by the Board's consideration of its 
untimely request for attorney fees and costs is untenable: Instead, the lack of due process 
afforded to Petitioner in this matter is evident: The Board's Final Order was clear and 
unambiguous and required the Board to file its Affidavit of Costs and Fees within 30 days, at 
which time Petitioner was to be afforded an opportunity to object and request a hearing. 
Consistent with the Board's Order, Petitioner did just that by his Objection, wherein he requested 
a hearing. (See, R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment A.) Instead of setting the matter 
for hearing, as set forth as the required procedure in the Final Order, the Board requested, and 
not surprisingly the Board granted to itself, an opportunity to brief the issue and to submit 
additional evidence to support its failure to timely file its Affidavit. Having given itself an 
opportunity to attempt to cure its own mistake, the Board ultimately entered its Memorandum 
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Decision and order on Costs and Fees on August 2.2012. wherein the Board adopted, in full, its 
own arguments made with respect to the reasonahleness of the fees and costs requested. as well 
as the "good cause" for its failure to comply with a deadline of its own making. To suggest that 
Petitioner was provided with a meaningful opportunity to respond to the Board's arguments is 
tenuous, at best. As illustrated herein, the Board's decision to extend its deadline in order that 
other licensees not be punished for the Board's [in]actions is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record as a whole, and is arbitrary. capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
G. The Board's consideration of the Affidavit of Lori Peel and Affidavit of Dennis 
Stevenson, filed May 21, 2012, was unfounded, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse 
of discretion. 
The Board's consideration of the Affidavit of Lori Peel and Affidavit of Dennis 
Stevenson, filed May 21, 2012, was unfounded, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion 
because the Board failed to identify a factual or legal basis for the consideration of the same at 
this point in the proceedings. The Board's Final Order permitted the Board to file an Affidavit of 
Costs and Fees within 30-days. The Affidavit of Lori Peel and the Affidavit of Dennis 
Stevenson were both filed beyond the 30-days permitted pursuant to the Board's Order. 
VIII. THE BOARD IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
By its Respondent's Brief, Respondents have requested an award of attorney's fees on 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. Idaho Code § 12-11 i 3 does not support an award of 
attorney's fees to the Board in the present matter. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative 
proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
13 Prior to its amendment in March, 2012, Idaho Code § 12-117( 1) did not allow a court to award attorney 
fees on judicial review of an administrative decision. See St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical 
Center, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Gooding County, 150 Idaho 484, 490,248 P.3d 735, 
741 (2011); Smith v. Washington Cnty., 150 Idaho 388, 391, 247 P.3d 615, 618 (2010)). 
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state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, or 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, as the case may 
be including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that 
the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in faet or law. 
Here, by its present request, the Board has failed to advance any legal or factual support 
for an assertion that Petitioner has "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Rather, as 
noted herein, and as supported by the record, Petitioner has contested the Board's Final Order 
based upon undisputed substantive and procedural irregularities that require reversal of the 
Board's Final Order. In particular, the Board's undisputed failure to comply with the statutory 
directive ofIdaho Code § 54-4107, the Board's unsupported finding ofa violation ofIdaho Code 
§ 54-4107(1)(d) and (e), as well as (c); and, the procedural irregularities resulting from Mr. 
lanoush's involvement in this matter which deprived Petitioner of the right to have this matter 
decided by a fair and impartial Board. For these same reasons, however, Petitioner is entitled to 
an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 on this appeal. 
IX. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons stated above, Williams respectfully requests that the Court: 
1. Reverse the Board's February 27, 2012, Final Order, hold that the lanoush 
Investigation and Orman Investigation were initiated in violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107 
and/or the adopted procedures and policies of IBOL and the Board, and dismiss with prejudice 
all claims against Williams; 
2. Dismiss Counts One through Eight in the March 7, 2011, Amended Complaint 
based upon the Board not having met its burden of proof, and there being no "substantial 
misrepresentation"; 
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3. Reverse the Board's Final Order based upon Board misconduct and bias, and a 
denial of Williams' due process rights to a fair and impartial trial; 
4. Dismiss Counts One through Eight in the March 7, 2011, Amended Complaint 
based upon the Board's Final Order being (i) arbitrary, (ii) capricious, and (iii) an abuse of 
discretion; 
5. Reverse the Board's revocation of Williams' license and imposition of a fine 
based upon the Board's Final Order being (i) arbitrary, (ii) capricious, and (iii) an abuse of 
discretion; 
6. F or an award of Williams' attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117; and 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this 3 O~ of January, 2014. 
JONES. GLEDHlLL. FUHRMAN. GOURLEY, P.A. 
By: 
Kimbell D. Gourley, Oft] Firm 
Attorneys for Petitionty imothy Williams 
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